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After the United States Supreme Court handed down Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services,1 pollsters asked whether people ap-
proved or disapproved of the decision.2 The question was inapt, for
Webster could elicit both approving and disapproving responses
from persons on both sides of the abortion debate. Webster clearly
indicated a new direction in abortion law, but it stopped short on
the journey and left uncertainty about the precise path to be fol-
lowed. The new direction set by Webster is evident in one powerful
symbol: Justice Harry Blackmun, the author of Roe v. Wade,3 dis-
sented.in Webster.4 The new direction is also evident from the fact
that the Webster Court upheld 5 all of Missouri's restrictions on
abortion, thereby reversing the lower courts, which had found nu-
* B.A., Indiana University, 1970; J.D., University of Florida School of Law, 1973; Part-
ner, Brames, McCormick, Bopp & Abel, Terre Haute, Indiana; General Counsel, National
Right to Life Committee, Inc.; Former Member, President's Committee on Mental Retarda-
tion; Editor, ISSUES IN LAW & MEDICINE.
** B.A., Indiana Wesleyan University, 1973; M.A.R., Asbury Theological Seminary,
1975; J.D., Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis, 1987; Associate, Brames, Mc-
Cormick, Bopp & Abel, Terre Haute, Indiana.
1. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
2. The New York Times/CBS NEWS Poll, "Abortion: A Wide Range of Views", N.Y.
Times, Aug. 3, 1989, at A18. This sort of approve/disapprove poll on a complex case such as
Webster is entirely without merit for its failure to focus on the specific object of approval or
disapproval. Thus, the fact that 14% approved and 23% disapproved of Webster is mean-
ingless, e.g., some of the polled parties might have disapproved of Webster for failure to
explicitly overturn the right to abortion and some may have disapproved it for allowing the
states more power to regulate abortion.
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(which made unconstitutional the abortion laws of all the
States).
4. Justice Blackmun has twice predicted the demise of Roe, claiming that there now
exist sufficient votes on the Court to overrule Roe. Blackmun says high court has votes to
overturn Roe, Davenport Catholic Messenger, Sept. 28, 1989, at 7; Blackmun Sees Switch
on Abortion, USA Today, Sept. 14, 1988, at Al.
5. Certain provisions were not considered as either moot or not ripe, but nothing was
found unconstitutional.
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merous constitutional flaws. This signals a dramatic change from
the days when a pro-Roe majority struck down any meaningful ef-
forts by the states to regulate abortion. Most importantly, the
opinions in Webster revealed that a majority of the Justices on the
Court no longer approve key elements of the framework con-
structed in Roe v. Wade. The result is a de facto alteration of
abortion law which reaches far beyond the actual holding of Web-
ster.6 Indeed, Webster was a de facto reversal of Roe v. Wade.
But by failing to expressly state in a single opinion what a ma-
jority of the Justices have stated in separate opinions, the Court
left abortion law unsettled. Until the new working majority ex-
pressly articulates together what its members have said separately,
many courts and state legislatures will hesitate to recognize and
act upon the demise of Roe v. Wade. Roe is dead but awaits its
post-mortem formalities. Webster left abortion jurisprudence in
limbo.
Although Webster was unsatisfactory, it set the stage for the
eventual express reconsideration and reversal of Roe. All the key
elements were dealt with-in varying degrees of resolution by
members of the Court-(1) the degree of implication of precedent
necessary for reconsideration to occur,' (2) whether stare decisis
prevents reconsideration of Roe v. Wade," and (3) whether, under a
proper substantive due process analysis, there is a fundamental
right to abortion.9 These three themes swirled through the briefs,
arguments, and opinions of Webster."0
However, while Webster signalled a rejection of Roe v. Wade, it
did not do so by rejecting substantive due process analysis or the
right of privacy. Webster, together with other opinions of the
Court from last term, reveal that both substantive due process and
the right of privacy enjoy broad support.
6. This de facto transformation of abortion jurisprudence is discussed in greater de-
tail in Bopp & Coleson, What Does Webster Mean?, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1989) (setting
forth the changes in abortion jurisprudence, noted briefly infra, and demonstrating that
Webster poses no threat to contraceptive rights and civil rights, nor does it sanction undue
burdens on the liberty of pregnant women).
7. See infra notes 14-31 and accompanying text.
8. The question of stare decisis presented no apparent problem to any of the new
working majority on abortion. See, Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3056 (plurality opinion). It will
not be dealt with herein.
9. See infra sections II(B), III, and IV.
10. Another theme present in the briefs, oral arguments, media accounts, and various
commentaries was a concern that Webster portends dire consequences for other rights. Such




This support is of special interest in light of the concerns ex-
pressed by Robert Bork, nominated by President Reagan to the
Supreme Court, about substantive due process analysis in general
and the right of privacy in particular.11 These concerns figured
largely in the refusal of the Senate to confirm Bork as a Justice of
the Supreme Court.12
However, while the two newest Justices support substantive due
process, the analysis has undergone fundamental changes. These
changes make the application of substantive due process more ob-
jective and narrow its potential scope. Thus, some of the problems
often perceived 3 with substantive due process are ameliorated,
and the analysis is retained as a vehicle for protection of family-
related matters. Moreover, under this new analysis, it has become
even more apparent that there is no fundamental right to abortion.
This article will focus first on the ways in which Webster unset-
tled abortion law by rejecting the key elements of Roe and why the
Court was unable to articulate this in a single opinion. Then it will
turn to the implications of Webster, and other decisions from last
term, for the future of substantive due process in general and abor-
tion in particular.
II. Webster REVEALED DISAGREEMENT ON RECONSIDERATION
STANDARDS BUT SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT ON ABORTION
While the Webster majority has shown substantial unanimity on
the subject of abortion in separate opinions, it was unable to state
its consensus in Webster because of concerns that Roe was not suf-
ficiently implicated for reconsideration to occur.
A. Disagreement: When Is Precedent Sufficiently Implicated for
Purposes of Reconsideration?
Justice Scalia called for plenary reversal of Roe in the Webster
case. 4 However, the plurality, consisting of Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices White and Kennedy, declared that only the tri-
11. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
(1971). See also, R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990).
12. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1987, at Al, col. 3 (re questioning of Bork in Senate
confirmation hearings).
13. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920 (1973); Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion
Cases, 1973 SuP. CT. REV. 159.
14. 109 S. Ct. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and conurring in the judgment).
1990
Duquesne Law Review
mester scheme was sufficiently implicated for reconsideration. 5
Justice O'Connor thought that nothing of Roe was implicated,
preventing any express reconsideration of Roe in Webster.1
6
Justice O'Connor relied on the "avoidance" principle employed
by the Court in Rescue Army v. Court of Los Angeles to "avoid[]
passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions
pressed upon it for decision (footnote omitted) . . ., notwithstand-
ing conceded jurisdiction, until necessity compels it in the per-
formance of constitutional duty.' 7 Such employment of the avoid-
ance principle to escape reconsideration of Roe in Webster was
misplaced. This is so for several reasons.18
First, the Supreme Court early recognized its duty to decide
matters properly before it: "It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."' 9 Any self-
imposed limitations created by the Court must be exercised in
light of the Court's duty to resolve even matters it would rather
avoid.20 As Justice Marshall wrote in Cohens v. Virginia,': "Ques-
tions may occur which we would gladly avoid, but we cannot avoid
them. All we can do, is to exercise our best judgment and conscien-
tiously to perform our duty. ' 2' Rather than declaring what the law
is, the Webster Court elected reticence, leaving abortion jurispru-
dence in chaos, with courts,23 and legislatures uncertain of the
15. Id. at 3056 (plurality opinion).
16. Id. at 3060-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
17. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 569 (1947).
18. See generally Bopp & Coleson, Judicial Standard of Review and Webster, 15 AM.
J. L. MED. 211 (1989).
19. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)(emphasis added).
20. Professor Gunther has styled a neo-Brandeisian fallacy the misuse of the "avoid-
ance" principles set forth by Justice Brandeis in his concurrence to Ashwander v. TVA, 297
U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936)(Brandeis, J., concurring), to support a view that this Court has a
general discretion not to adjudicate. See generally Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Pas-
sive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L.
Rev. 1 (1964)(commenting on the content and uses of the Ashwander rules). Cf. Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMEN-
TAL LAW (1961.).
This article does not enter into the debate over the Court's discretion to decline the exer-
cise of jurisdiction. It merely addresses the necessity of deciding all elements of a case which
are required in giving a legal justification for the Court's decision when a case is decided by
the Court. The standard of review is not an issue which may logically be avoided. It is
different in kind from construing a statute to avoid constitutional difficulty or deciding a
case on procedural grounds to avoid a constitutional issue.
21. 6 Wheat 264, 404 (1821)
22. Id. at 404.
23. See, e.g., In re T.W., No. 74,143, slip op. at 6 (Fla. Sup. Ct. Oct. 5, 1989) (wherein
the Florida Supreme Court held that the right of privacy provision in the Florida Constitu-
Vol. 28:271
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standards to follow.
Second, in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,24  Justice
O'Connor joined a majority which logically resolved the issue of
when precedent is implicated (for reconsideration purposes) in a
way that would have allowed reconsideration of Roe in Webster. In
Patterson, the plaintiff brought an action based upon a statutory
right created by an interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in Runyon v.
McCrary,26 i.e., that section 1981 encompasses a private contract
between an employer and employee.26
Under the rule of Patterson, if a former case creates the right
under which an action is brought, the former case is sufficiently
implicated for purposes of reconsideration. Logic compels such a
result both when a prior case establishes the right and when it cre-
ates the analysis to be employed in judicial review. The plaintiff in
Webster relied on both the right and the analysis created in Roe
when it brought suit, as did the lower courts in striking down the
Missouri statutes.
2 7
The Supreme Court has acknowledged this principle in practice,
by first deciding the standard of review in its cases 28 before apply-
ing that standard to the statutes being reviewed. The Webster
amalgam of opinions neglected this essential first step in constitu-
tion protects the right to abortion, after relying on Roe v. Wade but dismissing Webster on
the basis that, "while Roe was "severely questioned" in Webster, it "remains-the federal
law.").
24. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
25. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
26. It is a more difficult task where a prior case is not as directly implicated as to
provide the right upon which the suit is founded. This is evident in South Carolina v. Gath-
ers, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989), decided by the Court last term. In Gathers, Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, decided that the holding of the prior
case of Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), was not sufficiently implicated for reconsid-
eration of that case. Gathers, at 2212 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
and Kennedy, J.). This was so because Gathers involved prosecutorial comments about a
criminal victim's character in closing argument, not in the submission of evidence which
Booth forbade. Thus, Booth was not sufficiently implicated for Justices O'Connor and Ken-
nedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist to reconsider that case. Id. at 2211. Justice Scalia would
have overruled Booth, id. at 2217-18, as, apparently, would have Justice White. Id. at 2211.
27. . Webster, 662 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Mo. 1987), superseding 655 F. Supp. 1300 (W.D.
Mo. 1987); 851 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988).
28. The list of abortion cases in which establishment of the standard of review was
done as a threshold matter includes the following: Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 189, 195
(1973); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 60-61 (1976);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470 (1977); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 386-87 (1979);
Bellotti v. Baird (II), 443 U.S. 622, 633-42 (1979); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 311-18,
319-20, 322-23, 324 (1980); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 408-10 (1981); Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 419-20, 426-31 (1983); Thornburgh v. Ameri-
can College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986).
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tional analysis, but it is logically unavoidable.29
Even under the analysis apparently employed by Justice
O'Connor in Webster,s i.e., that a statute must directly contradict
a prior holding of the Court in order for reconsideration to be
proper,31 Roe was implicated in Webster. This is so because Justice
O'Connor relied on the "unduly burdensome "32 test to uphold part
of the statutory scheme in Webster. This test was expressly re-
jected in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health by the
Court, which held that it was contradictory to Roe.
33
Therefore, in Webster, the constitutionality of Roe v. Wade, was
before the Court and reconsideration was appropriate. However,
Justice O'Connor has already reconsidered Roe herself, in her deci-
sions in Akron and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists.3 4 Reading her opinion in Thornburgh
29. The core issue in any constitutional challenge to a statute is whether the statute
comports with the Constitution-not whether it complies with a prior decision of the Court.
Deciding whether a statute conforms to the requirements of some precedent is but a short-
hand way of asking whether constitutional requirements are met. Therefore, it is essential to
the analysis to determine what the Constitution requires. In a matter already decided, this
question is answered by citation to precedent, the principles of which are applied to the new
fact situation. But in each subsequent case, the question of what the Constitution requires
must be asked. It may be simply answered by reaffirmation of the precedent, either express
or implicit, but it must be answered. The Constitution is at issue in constitutional
adjudication.
The standard of review is not of the same nature as a constitutional challenge to a statute
which may be avoided by deciding a matter on a statutory, procedural, or independent state
law basis. The issue of the correct standard of review arises precisely when the Court has
been unable to avoid a constitutional question and must determine whether a statute is
constitutional. It is inherently necessary to decide in the discharge of the Court's constitu-
tional duty and may not properly be avoided.
30. Note that this is a different rule for implication of precedent (for reconsideration
purposes) than that which she employed in joining the Patterson majority.
31. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3060-61.
32. Id. at 3063.
33. Akron, 462 U.S. 416. In Akron, the Court found the unduly burdensome test, to be
an unconstitutional form of analysis, forbidden by the dictates of Roe v. Wade itself. Id. at
420 n.1. Logically then, any invocation of or reliance upon the unduly burdensome test
would be in direct derogation of Roe. However, in Webster, Justice O'Connor readily relied
upon this analysis to uphold the statutes at issue in Webster and to declare that all of the
Missouri statute could be upheld under prior decisions of the Court, at the same time argu-
ing that no prior abortion decision of the Court was sufficiently implicated for purposes of
reconsideration. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3060. At a very minimum, however, the resurrection
of the unduly burdensome test implicated Akron, directly rejecting a key holding of that
decision.
34. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). One question which has arisen in recent abortion cases is
whether the parties must ask for reconsideration? See, e.g., id. at 828 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) ("[Blecause Pennsylvania has not asked the Court to reconsider or overrule Roe v.
Wade [cite omitted], I do not address that question."). Precedent reveals that reconsidera-
tion of a constitutional issue is not governed by whether the parties have requested recon-
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with the opinions of four other Justices in Webster reveals sub-
stantial agreement by a majority of the Court that Roe was an un-
constitutional decision.
B. Agreement: Roe Was an Unconstitutional Decision
In Akron, Justice O'Connor declared that the trimester frame-
work constructed by Roe had "no justification in law or logic." 35
On this point a majority has now agreed. The opinions of the new-
est Justices, Scalia and Kennedy, taken together with those of the
Roe dissenters, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, and
Justice O'Connor's opinions in Thornburgh and Akron reveal that
a majority of the Court now believe that Roe was an unconstitu-
tional decision.
Because of the lack of majority support for several key elements
of Roe, that case is de facto overruled. This is apparent from a
predictive analysis,"6 i.e., determining what sort of restrictions on
abortion will be upheld in the future. Based on what a majority of
the Court has now said in separate opinions, it is clear that the
express overruling of all or a substantial part of Roe awaits only
the proper case. The elements of Roe which are sub silentio over-
ruled go to the heart of the current abortion constitutional
analysis.
First, support for the trimester scheme of Roe has disappeared.
Justice O'Connor declared her belief that a state has a compelling
interest in unborn life and maternal health throughout pregnancy
in her earlier dissents to Akron and Thornburgh.37 With Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia,3" and Kennedy saying
sideration. Last term, in Patterson, 109 S. Ct. 2363, the Court reconsidered Runyon, 427
U.S. 160, without any request from the parties. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2380 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)("I find it disturbing that the Court has in this case chosen to reconsider, without
any request from the parties .. "). Moreover, Justice O'Connor, in Akron, reached and
reconsidered Roe in her dissent, although no party had requested consideration. Akron, 462
U.S. at 452, 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
35. 462 U.S. at 459 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
36. The concept of a sub silentio reversal is a familiar one in the law. It is based on a
predictive analysis of what a court will do, as evidenced by written opinions which undercut
a case or legal principle without expressly saying so. Cf. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARv. L. REv. 457, 457 (1897) (declaring the state of the law to be only a prediction of what
a court will decide); Robertson, The Future of Early Abortion, A.B.A. JOURNAL, Oct. 1989, at
73 (employing a similar predictive analysis by polling the opinions of the Justices).
37. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 828 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)("I ... remain of the views
expressed in my dissent in Akron [cite omitted]. The State has compelling interests in en-
suring maternal health and in protecting potential human life. . . throughout pregnancy.").
38. As Justice Scalia would reverse Roe, it is assumed that, to the extent a fundamen-
1990 277
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the same thing in Webster, it is readily apparent that a majority of
this Court has now recognized these two interests as existing
throughout pregnancy-indicating the demise of the trimester
scheme.39
Second, the very nature of a woman's interest in choosing abor-
tion has changed. In Roe, the Court determined that a woman has
a fundamental right to choose abortion, employing a substantive
due process analysis. The Webster plurality declared that a woman
has only a "liberty interest"'40 in abortion under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4' Justice O'Connor, with
her advocacy of the rational basis standard of review in most cases,
agrees that there is no general, fundamental right to abortion.42
However, where there is an undue burden, she might find a funda-
mental right, evidenced by her requiring a compelling state inter-
est to justify regulation of abortion in such cases.43 Thus, there is
now a majority of the Court which no longer believes that there is
a general fundamental right to abortion.
Third, the unduly burdensome test is now the de facto threshold
standard of review for abortion statutes. It is the lowest common
denominator of the current majority on abortion issues. Under this
new test, some abortion restrictions already found unconstitu-
tional, such as those rejected in Akron and Thornburgh, will now
be found constitutional.
Fourth, substantive due process analysis is de facto modified in
abortion cases to exclude the necessity that an abortion restriction
be narrowly tailored to effect only the compelling interest support-
ing it. This is so, again, because Justice O'Connor's views are now
the lowest common denominator among the working majority on
abortion issues. It has been generally thought since Roe that the
fundamental rights analysis required the showing (1) that the state
has a compelling interest and (2) that the legislation enacted is
tal right to abortion is given continued recognition, he would agree that there are offsetting
compelling interests in maternal health and unborn life.
39. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3057.
40. Id. at 3058. See infra. notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
41. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3058.
42. Akron, 462 U.S. at 453 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
43. Id. The scope of this constitutional protection has not been made clear, but it
encompasses "absolute obstacles" and "severe restrictions." Thornburg, 476 U.S. at 828. It
remains to be seen whether Justice O'Connor intends constitutional protection against abso-
lute obstacles for any particular pregnant woman or only against absolute obstacles to abor-
tion in general. Even in cases of absolute obstacle, however, where Justice O'Connor might
recognize a fundamental right to abortion, she notes that state's compelling interests might
yet justify the state-created obstacle.
Vol. 28:271
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narrowly tailored to effect only the compelling interest." But Jus-
tice O'Connor wrote in Akron:
The Court has never required that state regulation that burdens the abor-
tion decision be "narrowly drawn" to express only the relevant state inter-
est. In Roe, the Court mentioned "narrowly drawn" legislative enactments,
but the Court never actually adopted this standard in the Roe analysis. In
its decision today, the Court fully endorsed the Roe requirement that a bur-
densome health regulation, or as the Court appears to call it, a "significant
obstacle" be "reasonably related" to the state compelling interest. The
Court recognizes that "[a] state necessarily must have latitude in adopting
regulations of general applicability in this sensitive area.""
Thus, it is clear that Webster substantially altered abortion juris-
prudence by revealing the opinions on abortion of Justices Scalia
and Kennedy and, thereby, revealing that majority support for the
Roe standard of review has dissolved.
III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS HAS BEEN REFINED
In addition to the changes in substantive due process analysis as
it relates to abortion noted above, generally applicable changes
have been made in substantive due process analysis.
A. All Members of the Court Have Approved Substantive Due
Process By Use
It should be first noted that substantive due process enjoys
broad support on the Court. The newest members, Justices Scalia
and Kennedy, have authored or joined opinions employing the
methodology. In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,46 Justice Scalia wrote a
plurality opinion which employed substantive due process analysis
to promote and protect very traditional views of the "unitary"
family."7 Justice Kennedy concurred in all but one footnote of that
opinion. 48 All nine Justices in Michael H. approved substantive
44. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
45. Akron, 462 U.S. at 467 n.ll (O'Connor, J., dissenting)(citations omitted).
46. 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989). Here, Michael H., the putative father of a child, Victoria
D., born to Carol D. and held out by her husband, Gerald D., as his daughter, filed a filia-
tion action to establish paternity and obtain visitation rights, after a blood test indicated a
98.07% probability of paternity, in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The Superior
Court granted summary judgment for Gerald D., who, under California law was presumed to
be Victoria's father because he was living with Carol D. at the time Victoria was born and
desired to raise her as his own. The California Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme
Court of California denied discretionary review.
47. Id. at 2341 (plurality opinion).
48. Id. at 2346 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, joined by Kennedy, J.).
1990 279
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due process by use.
Although no voices are heard on the Court rejecting substantive
due process, both the agenda and mode of the new majority using
it seems different from that of the old majority. Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens must be less sanguine about sub-
stantive due process when it is employed to protect traditional val-
ues49 rather than to expand abortion rights. However, the new
working majority seems intent on making substantive due process
more objective and less result-oriented, as noted below. Of special
interest is the diverse terminology which has emerged for substan-
tive due process analysis. It may reveal different conceptions of the
analysis itself.
The common understanding of the terminology of substantive
due process includes the following uses of key terms. "Liberty in-
terests" include those activities which individuals would like to do
without government regulation and which are constitutionally pro-
tected only under the rational-basis standard of review. "Funda-
mental liberty interests" and "fundamental rights" are those inter-
ests for which a compelling interest must be shown before narrowly
tailored state restrictions may be enforced. Both levels of liberty
interests are a part of the "liberty" protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
However, in Michael H., Justice Scalia employed a different for-
mulation when he said, "This is not the stuff of which fundamental
rights qualifying as liberty interests are made." 51 If Justice Scalia
subscribes to the traditional analysis, the term "liberty interests"
here must mean anything protected under the "liberty" term of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Similarly, Justice Brennan, in
Michael H., employed the term "liberty interest" as an interest re-
49. Id. at 2350 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("It is ironic that an approach so utterly de-
pendent on tradition is so indifferent to our precedents."); cf. Id. at 2351 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (Michael H., the alleged biological father, has a constitutional right "not to con-
form") with Id. at 2345 (plurality opinion) ("If Michael has a 'freedom not to conform'
(whatever that means), Gerald [the marital father] must equivalently have a 'freedom to
conform.' ").
50. Cf. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ("fundamental liberty interest"
requires compelling interest); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 788-97 (White, J., dissenting) (abor-
tion is a rational-basis type liberty); Roe, 410 U.S. at 172-73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(abortion is a rational-basis level of liberty).
51. 109 S. Ct. at 2344 (plurality opinion). Consider also the Webster plurality's com-
ment that "there is wisdom in not unnecessarily attempting to elaborate the abstract differ-
ences between a 'fundamental right' to abortion, . . . a 'limited fundamental constitutional
right,' . . . or a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. 109 S. Ct. at
3058 (plurality opinion).
Vol. 28:271
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quiring a compelling interest to regulate.2 Without further com-
mentary by Members of the Court, it is impossible to determine
whether these different uses indicate merely imprecise use of terms
or a different analytical structure.1
3
B. The Test for Fundamentality Is Increasingly Historical and
Objective
The new working majority on the Supreme Court is concerned
about the danger of constitutionally illegitimate decisions, result-
ing from a failure to supply a firm grounding for a decision in the
history and text of the Constitution.
This concern has its roots in respect for the rule of law, adopted
by the People as a cornerstone of our constitutional republic.54 The
result of this decision by the People to enshrine the rule of law in
the Constitution of our Nation is that decisions of the judiciary are
only legitimate if they can demonstrate by reasoned opinion that
they are firmly grounded in the Constitution. As stated by Justice
White:
The Judiciary, including this Court, is the most vulnerable and comes near-
est to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having
little or no cognizable roots in the language or even the design of the Consti-
tution. Realizing that the present construction of the Due Process Clause
52. Id. at 2352 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. For example, such language could imply constitutional protection for fundamental
rights (requiring a showing of compelling interest) but none for lower-level rights tradition-
ally protected under the older substantive due process formula requiring a rational basis for
justification.
54. This danger is not only to the integrity of the court making the decision but also
to the principle of the rule of law itself. If "the only limits to . . . judicial intervention
become the predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of this Court,"
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977), the rule of law has been supplanted by
the rule of man. While rule by Platonic guardians or a monarch has certain advantages over
governance by law under "a stagnant, archaic, hidebound document steeped in the
prejudices and superstitions of a time long past," Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2351 (Brennan,
J., dissenting), it was the considered opinion of the Framers of our Constitution and the
People of the United States that the advantages of a constitutional rule-of-law regime out-
weighed its disadvantages. They established this Nation as a rule-of-law regime par excel-
lence, with the Constitution as the supreme law of the land. For a fuller discussion of this
point, see Bopp & Coleson, The Right to Abortion: Anomalous, Absolute, and Ripe for
Reversal, 3 B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 181, 194-98 (1989). The Framers of the Constitution did allow
for changes in the Constitution by means of amendment, as occurred after the Civil War
with regard to slavery, and by the use of general language in the formulation of its express
protections. However, some textual indeterminacy is not a license to abandon the rule of law
by rejecting the Constitution in favor of unbridled discretion for any branch of the govern-
ment. The danger is especially acute when the judiciary deals with penumbral rights, which
are already derived from general formulations.
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represents a major judicial gloss on its terms, as well as on the anticipation
of the Framers . . ., the Court should be extremely reluctant to breathe still
further substantive content into the Due Process Clause .. .5
As a result, the Court has relied increasingly on the historical, and
more objective, formulation of the measure for fundamentality, i.e.,
"so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.""6 For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick,"
the Court's reliance on the historical test" for fundamentality over
the more abstract formulation, i.e., "implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty," 59 is evident.6 0 In setting forth the rule in Michael
H., Justice Scalia emphasized especially the dangers of illegitimate
decisions" and the need to contain these by employment of an his-
torical/traditional value test.2 This is in marked contrast to Jus-
tice Brennan's assertion that an historical test makes substantive
due process redundant and the Court should not so limit itself 3
The result of this objective, historical focus is to limit the danger
of constitutionally illegitimate decisions, which has been recog-
nized by the Court.
A second danger, recognized by Members of the Court, is that of
result-oriented formulations of issues or rules. Often the very for-
mulation of a rule or an issue dictates the outcome of a judicial
decision. To prevent such decision-by-definition, the new working
majority on the Court has endeavored to establish neutral princi-
ples to govern its decisions.6 4 These neutral principles, equally ap-
plicable to all cases no matter what their subject, must then be
applied in an equally neutral manner to all cases. This principle
applies especially to the formulation of proposed fundamental
rights to be tested against the history of our Nation.
The neutrality principle means that the proposed fundamental
right must be formulated without regard to the decisional out-
come,. Rather, the formulation of the proposed fundamental right
55. Moore, 431 U.S. at 544 (White, J., dissenting) (quoted in Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at
2341 (plurality opinion)); cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (White, J., writ-
ing for the majority).
56. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
57. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
58. Id. at 192-94 (plurality opinion).
59. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92.
60. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 nn.5-7.
61. Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2341.
62. Id. at 2341-42.
63. Id. at 2351 (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf. Id. at 2344 n.6 (plurality opinion).
64. A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 114 (1976).
65. That establishing neutral principles is difficult at times may be seen in the collo-
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must be governed by the principles established by precedents of
the Supreme Court.
In brief, these precedents show that the formulation must not be
a generalized abstraction countenancing innumerable protections
under the rubric of a fundamental right. Employing a sufficiently
broad characterization of proposed constitutional rights, one could
arguably encompass nearly anything within the pale of the Consti-
tution. But such a practice is self-evidently illegitimate as constitu-
tional law, because it places no limits on the discretion of the judi-
ciary. The result would be the rule of man rather than the rule of
law.
Narrow formulation of a proposed fundamental right also avoids
another danger recognized by the Court, that of overbroad deci-
sions in violation of its constitutionally allotted power under Arti-
cle III of the Constitution and in violation of sound principles of
adjudication. As applied to the formulation of a proposed funda-
mental right, this danger may be avoided by confining considera-
tion of fundamental rights protection to the actual case at bar. To
define the proposed fundamental right overbroadly is to decide
matters not before the Court. To avoid such dangers, the Supreme
Court, in prior formulations of proposed fundamental rights, has
agreed on certain basic principles which may be distilled into the
following rule.
C. A Proposed Fundamental Right Must Be Formulated In A
Concrete, Fact-Sensitive Manner
It is not sufficient for constitutional adjudication of asserted fun-
damental rights to ask whether the asserted right is fundamental
in the history and tradition of our Nation. One must first ask
whether the asserted right is the properly formulated one.
For example, suppose a person asserted constitutional protection
for the ancient custom of sacrificing one's child to a deity. Of
course, while the practice might be common in the history and tra-
dition of the ancient world, it would not be a common liberty in
the history and tradition of this Nation. Reason dictates that no
fundamental right be recognized, despite the hoary roots of the
practice.
But this result, which seems so obvious, rests entirely upon the
quys among members of this Court in the cases discussed infra. However, the difficulty of
the endeavor neither vitiates the importance and need to establish neutral principles nor
counsels abandonment of the effort.
1990
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expectation, both logical and intuitive, that the proposed right
would be formulated to describe the activity of a parent killing a
child rather than as the abstract right of parents to control their
children.6 6 The latter formulation would certainly find historical
support in this Nation, but would be an incorrect formulation of
the activity advanced for constitutional protection.
Because of the problem illustrated by this example, the Supreme
Court has established principles governing the formulation of a
proposed fundamental right. Proper formulation of the right is a
necessary threshold step before the proposed right is measured for
fundamentality against the history and tradition of our Nation.
The basic principle governing the formulation of a proposed fun-
damental right is that a proposed right must be expressed in a
concrete, fact-sensitive manner. This principle, in turn, may be
expressed in a three-prong rule.
First, the formulation of a proposed fundamental right should
focus on the activity proposed to be protected by taking into ac-
count all the relevant facts. This first prong requires that the for-
mulation of a proposed fundamental right focus upon the activity
actually involved in the case at bar, rather than upon broad, ab-
stract formulations of general historical rights. This assures the
concreteness which is appropriate when the expansion of recog-
nized constitutional protections is contemplated into areas without
express protection in the text of the Constitution.
The level of factual specificity should be that governed by all
facts relevant to the activity sought to be protected. It is evident
that certain facts of a case are only incidental to the activity for
which constitutional protection is sought. Inclusion of these irrele-
vant facts in the formulation of a proposed right would be the
equivalent of limiting a holding to its facts. By such a practice, no
principles relevant to other cases could ever be established. Reason
precludes such specificity just as it precludes broad, sweeping, ab-
stract formulations of a proposed right.
In practice then, satisfaction of this prong is attained by careful
formulation of the proposed right to be certain that it is a concrete
and fact-sensitive statement of the activity sought to be protected,
but that it is not so fact-sensitive as to include matters irrelevant
to the activity. Thus, a balance between overly narrow and overly
66. Likewise, the formulation of the alleged fundamental right as the right to control
the makeup of one's family would logically encompass infanticide, although the authors of
such a formula mean to encompass only contraception and abortion. Cf 12. L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1359 (2d ed. 1988).
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broad formulations is obtained by an emphasis on relevant facts
and upon the actual activity advanced before the Court.
For example, in a case where a person of one race desires to
marry a person of another race, the fact that a man and woman are
of different races is irrelevant to the activity of entering into a
marriage, which involves a state-sanctioned covenant between a
man and a woman to live in an historically recognized relation-
ship. 7 Likewise, the fact that one of the parties is incarcerated at
the time he or she wishes to enter into a marriage relationship is
irrelevant to the act of entering into a marriage relationship.6 8 Cer-
tain facts would be relevant to the activity of marriage, which
would necessarily be included in the formulation of a proposed
marriage relationship. For example, marriage between persons of
the same sex would be relevant, as altering radically the notion of
marriage. 9 Likewise, a proposed marriage between a person and a
member of another species, e.g., a horse, or between a person and
an inanimate object, e.g., a computer, would certainly require in-
corporation of those facts into the proposed fundamental right.
67. Cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (miscegenation law struck down on equal
protection and substantive due proces bases).
68. Cf. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (striking down prison regulations of mar-
riage and noting that marriage of a prisoner retained enough of the incidents of marriage to
make the fact that one of the parties was in prison irrelevant to the exercise of the constitu-
tionally protected right to marry).
The proper formulation of a proposed fundamental right should begin with the facts
presented by case, by which a court is governed under Article III, and then remove those
that are irrelevant. So, for example, Bowers began with the fact that the case involved two
males, which eliminated the need to consider heterosexual sodomy, but whether the sodomy
was oral or anal was irrelevant. See infra, notes 73-84 and accompanying text. Similarly, in
Turner, the Supreme Court was presented with the fact that a person incarcerated sought to
enter into a marriage without state interference. The Court found that incarceration was not
relevant to the formulation of the proposed protected activity, marriage. Turner, 107 S. Ct.
at 96.
The analysis of Turner also reveals that, before the Court considers whether a state has a
compelling interest for burdening a fundamental right, it must consider whether the restric-
tion passes the rational basis test, which the prison restriction on marriage, in Turner,
failed. 482 U.S. at 98. Many state regulations considered by the Court under heightened
substantive due process scrutiny also fail a rational basis test. Cf., e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972). There is no rational basis for withholding contraception from unmar-
ried couples engaging in copulation despite legal restrictions. Indeed, the state's interest in
having such couples employ contraceptive measures could logically be greater than not hav-
ing them do so. Moreover, for purposes of framing the proposed fundamental right, a focus
on the activity being engaged in, sexual intercourse with contraceptive measures, reveals
that whether the couple is married is irrelevant to the activity.
69. See Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 315, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (1971) ("[In com-
monsense and in a constitutional sense, there is a clear distinction between a marital restric-
tion based merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex."), ap-
peal dismissed 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
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Second, the formulation of a proposed fundamental right
should not be overbroad so as to encompass other activities which
are logically distinct and involve separate considerations. The
second prong provides another, conceptually distinct, check on an
overbroad formulation of a proposed fundamental right. It ex-
cludes matters logically distinct and separate.
For example, suppose that a person sought constitutional protec-
tion for a polygamous relationship.7" While the practice has vener-
able roots elsewhere, the fundamentality of this proposed funda-
mental right in the history and tradition of this Nation would turn
on the formulation of the proposed fundamental right to be histor-
ically tested. If the proposed right were styled simply the right to
marry, encompassing by its terms both monogamous and polyga-
mous marriages, the outcome would be doubtless, for a fundamen-
tal right to marriage has already been established.71 If, however,
the proposed right were formulated in a more concrete, fact-sensi-
tive manner, i.e., the right of a person to have multiple, concurrent
spouses, then the outcome is also doubtless, for polygamy has been
rejected in the history and tradition of our people. 72
Third, the formulation of a proposed fundamental right should
reasonably accommodate all the interests at stake in a case. This
third prong assures that, in pruning away relevant facts, the for-
mulator has not pruned away other interests at stake in the case.
These may not be lopped off as irrelevant, but are per se relevant
and must be included in the formulation. If interests are at stake
in a case, i.e., will be affected by the proposed declaration of fun-
damental right, they are relevant to an activity advanced for con-
stitutional protection and must be reasonably accommodated by
inclusion in the formulation of the proposed fundamental right.
Logically, of course, other interests must also be considered in
70. This illustration assumes, of course, that the Supreme Court would not simply
invoke stare decisis to decide a case challenging laws prohibiting polygamy. Cf. Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding anti-polygamy laws against constitutional at-
tack) with New York Times, October 9, 1977, at 1, col. (estimating that twenty to thirty
thousand people in the United States live in polygamous families).
71. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
72. Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145. The fact that ours is "not an assimilative, homogenous soci-
ety, but a facilitative, pluralistic one, in which we must be willing to abide someone else's
unfamiliar or even repellant practice," Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2351 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing), and in which " 'liberty' must include the freedom not to conform," Id., has not caused
the Court to reject all of our culture's traditional values. Indeed, the very concept of a cul-
ture presupposes some commonly held values which to some unavoidable extent are im-
posed upon non-conformists. Thus, in Reynolds, the Supreme Court forbade to Mormons
the right not to conform by taking multiple wives.
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determining whether one may exercise a right declared fundamen-
tal or is denied this liberty by the compelling interests of others.
However, the presence of other relevant interests must also be con-
sidered in the formulation of the proposed fundamental right to
prevent abstract formulations and to prevent declaration of funda-
mental rights which are not properly so--with the result that all
state regulation of such activities must be supported by a compel-
ling interest and narrowly tailored to effect only that interest.
7 3
For example, a proposed fundamental right to discharge fire-
arms, the possession of which is expressly protected in the Consti-
tution, is logically distinct from a right to discharge a firearm into
an innocent person.74 The latter's interests logically must be in-
cluded in the very formulation of the proposed fundamental right.
Similarly, fatherhood by rape puts at stake the interests of others
(the rape victim) in a way different from fatherhood by consensual
sexual intercourse, so that the rape victim's interest should be in-
corporated in a proposed right relating to visitation of the father
with the child so conceived.75 In other words, the formulation
should not ask whether the father-child relationship is fundamen-
tal but whether the rapist father-child relationship is fundamental.
This tri-partite rule for the correct formulation of proposed fun-
damental rights may be seen in several of the Court's cases. In
Bowers v. Hardwick,71 the Court applied the principles underlying
the rule presented herein by formulating the proposed fundamen-
tal right as the right to engage in "consensual homosexual sod-
omy."' 77 By so doing, it dealt with the statute as applied, focusing
on the specific activity for which constitutional protection was
sought. In its formulation, the Court did not include facts which
were irrelevant, e.g., whether the homosexual sodomy sought to be
protected involved oral or anal genital contact. Reason precludes
separate consideration of each possible form of sodomy between
homosexuals.
The Court also excluded nonconsensual sodomy, which was not
in the facts of the case. Likewise, the Court excluded heterosexual
73. The abortion cases demonstrate that virtually no regulation survives the compel-
ling state interest/narrowly tailored filter for state restrictions on fundamental rights. This
standard is too high for judicial review in areas traditionally governed by the police powers
of the states.
74. Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2342 n.4 (plurality opinion).
75. Id.
76. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
77. Id. at 188 n.2.
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sodomy from its formulation, because it was not a part of the ac-
tivity for which constitutional protection was sought.7 8 Such a for-
mulation, in addition to being beyond the facts of the case, would
have involved logically distinct and separate considerations, e.g.,
whether, if the couple were married, the principle underlying Gris-
wold v. Connecticut,79 would preclude regulation of their activities.
Because no marriage partner or other identifiable party with a rel-
evant interest was presented by the facts, the Court discussed no
interests of third parties.
The Bowers Court discussed and rejected several proposed ab-
stract formulations, noting their overbroad sweep. The Court first
noted that simply declaring the right to homosexual sodomy to be
encompassed by the right of privacy was improper, because none of
the activities to which that right had been extended, e.g., "family,
marriage, or procreation," 0 bore any logical "connection" to homo-
sexual sodomy.' Second, the Court rejected the broad formulation
of a right to engage in "any kind of private sexual conduct between
consenting adults," noting that precedent had determined that the
privacy right established by Griswold "did not reach so far."8 2
Third, the Bowers Court rejected a formulation of the proposed
fundamental right as the right do what one wishes "in the privacy
of the home."83 The Court noted that numerous activities, such as
possession of drugs and illegal weapons are not constitutionally
protected although they occur in the home. 4 The Court further
noted that narrowing the formulation by considering only "volun-
tary sexual conduct between consenting adults" in the privacy of
the home would include within its scope "adultery, incest, and
other sexual crimes" committed in the home.
8 5
By contrast, the Bowers dissenters formulated the proposed fun-
damental right in broad, abstract terms. Nor did they focus on the
78. Id.
79. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
80. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
81. Id. This comparative sort of analysis is favored by Justice Brennan, Michael H.,
109 S. Ct. at 2351, who would prefer a methodology which first establishes "more genera-
lized interests" as fundamental and then examines "the concrete limitation under considera-
tion" to see whether it "impermissibly impinges" on the "generalized interest." However,
such an analysis shifts the locus of power from the People, as established in the Constitu-
tion, to the judiciary.
82. Id. at 191 (citing Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5,
694 n.17 (1977)).
83. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 195-96.
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specific activity. Indeed, they proposed ten different abstract for-
mulations of a right which would encompass and protect homosex-
ual sodomy. 6 But by the abstractness of these dissenting formula-
tions, the dissenters cast a wide net, snaring numerous activities
within their confines. For example, many of these formulations
would enclose the practice of polygamy, discussed above, as well as
adultery and incest.8 7 In sum, the Bowers Court carefully followed
the principles of the rule set forth in this article, rejecting the
broad, abstract formulations of the proposed right urged by the
dissenters.
Last term, the rule of formulation set forth herein was also em-
ployed in the Court's decision of Michael H. v. Gerald D.,8s which
involved substantive due process analysis. The proposed right, in
Michael H., was formulated by the plurality as "the power of the
natural father to assert parental rights over a child born into a
woman's existing marriage with another man."89 This formulation
86. The Bowers dissenters formulated the proposed right as "the right to be let alone,"
Michael H., 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quotation marks and citation omit-
ted), the right to make "certain decisions" and do activities in "certain places," Id. at 204
(emphasis in original), to do things which "form so central a part of an individual's life," id.
at 204, "the ability independently to define one's identity," id. at 205 (quotation marks and
citation omitted), "the freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of these
intensely personal bonds," Id. (emphasis in original), "the fundamental interest all individu-
als have in controlling the nature of their intimate associations with others," Id. at 206, "the
right of an individual to conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy of his or her own
home," Id. at 208, and "the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing
order." Id. at 211. In addition, three dissenters formulated the proposed right as "the indi-
vidual's right to make certain unusually important decisions that will affect his own, or his
family's, destiny." Id. at 217 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. The Bowers dissent logically conceded the correctness of the methodological point
urged herein-at the same time that it rejected it in practice-by recognizing "simple, ana-
lytically sound distinctions between certain private, consensual conduct, . . . and adultery
and incest." 478 U.S. at 209 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
However, the only reasonable place to make these distinctions is in the formulation of the
proposed right. Otherwise, if a fundamental right to adultery and incest are found-based
on a broad right to engage in "intimate relations in the intimacy of his or her home," Id. at
208,-then a state would have to show a compelling interest and narrowly tailored restric-
tions to regulate these activities (a demanding, usually prohibitive task compared with
traditional exercise of police powers).
Moreover, the Bowers dissenters want judges to have the power to recognize fundamental
rights by definition, recognizing that distinctions exist among varieties of intimate activity,
whereas the Bowers majority leaves the power to determine the extent of constitutional
protection to the People, by employing neutral principles of formulation.
88. 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
89. Id. at 2343 (plurality opinion). Justice White did not agree with the plurality con-
cerning the formulation of the fundamental right in Michael H. He asserted that any inter-
est of the third party, Gerald D., required no additional consideration in that case. (Gerald
D. was already "well aware of the liaison.") Id. at 2362. However, this disagreement over the
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of the proposed rule is consistent with the rule advanced in this
article. First, it is concrete, and fact-sensitive, including all rele-
vant facts. Second, the formulation does not encompass other ac-
tivities which are logically distinct and involve other considera-
tions. Third, the formulation does not ignore the other interests
involved in the case.
A third example may be found in the Court's formulation of the
proposed fundamental right in Roe v. Wade.90 While the present
authors do not concede the correctness of Roe's holding, Roe did
correctly formulate the proposed fundamental right as a right to
abortion.9' This is especially evident in light of the efforts at oral
arguments in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services92 to
reformulate the right from a right to abortion to a right of procrea-
tive choice.
9 3
In Roe, the Court formulated the proposed fundamental right in
a concrete, fact-sensitive manner: the right to abortion. It did not
include within its formulation matters such as contraception and
sterilization-encompassed by a more general right of procrea-
tion-which are logically distinct and involve other considerations.
Nor did the Court agree with the overbroad formulation proposed
by some amici in Roe of "an unlimited right to do with one's body
as one pleases."94 Further, the Roe Court formulated the proposed
fundamental right to abortion in a manner which included the con-
cept of terminating the existence of the unborn, thus encompassing
application of the principles stated herein does not constitute rejection by Justice White of
the principle of narrow, concrete, fact-sensitive formulation of proposed fundamental rights,
which he employed in the opinion he authored for the Court in Bowers.
Furthermore, the agreement of Justice White with this analysis is shown in Thornburgh,
where he argued that because the abortion decision involves the taking of fetal life, the very
characterization of the liberty interest is changed from "the decision not to conceive in the
first place"; the "difference does not merely go to the weight of the state interest in regulat-
ing abortion." By comparison, he noted that the fundamental right of parents to make deci-
sions about childrearing does not protect the very different decision of some parents to
harm their children. 476 U.S. at 792-93 & n.2 (White, J., dissenting).
While certain members of the Court have differed as to the rule governing the precise
level of specificity for formulating proposed fundamental rights, cf. Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at
2344 n.6 (plurality opinion), with (O'Connor, J., concurring in part), Id. at 2346, this debate
does not affect the general principles established by the Court.
90. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
91. Roe focused specifically on the practice of abortion in its historical sketch. How-
ever, as this historical sketch did not demonstrate what was desired, the majority resorted
to the bare assertion that abortion was encompassed in a broader right of privacy. As
demonstrated herein, this is a flawed mode of analysis.
92. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
93. See Bopp, The Elusive Abortion Right, THE NAT'L L.J., June 12, 1989, at 13, col. 1.
94. 410 U.S. at 154.
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all interests at stake from the facts before the Court.9 5 While the
present authors believe that the interests of the unborn were not
reasonably accommodated in the subsequent balancing of rights,
the methodology of proposed rights formulation was sound.
IV. A RIGHT TO ABORTION FAILS THE NEw TEST FOR
FUNDAMENTALITY, BUT A RIGHT TO CARRY A CHILD TO TERM
WOULD BE FUNDAMENTAL
Under the revised analysis employed by the Court, it is apparent
that no fundamental right to abortion can be found. However, sub-
stantive due process analysis remains a valuable tool for protecting
truly fundamental rights-those actually enjoying specially pro-
tected status in this Nation's history and traditions-such as the
right to carry an unborn child to term.
A. The Right to Abortion Fails the New Test for
Fundamentality
Under the refined fundamental due process analysis, when the
Court finally does formally reconsider Roe v. Wade, it will have to
begin with a proper formulation of the proposed fundamental
right. Consistent with its own precedents, the Court will have to
formulate the proposed right in the same way that it did in
Roe-as a right to abortion-rather than as the right to procreate
or some other abstract formulation. Then it will have to test that
proposed right for fundamentality against the history and tradition
of our Nation.
This time, however, two things will be different: (1) a more accu-
rate account of the history will be employed, which demonstrates
that the states have long restricted abortion, making it not a fun-
damental liberty, and (2) the Court will not proceed to ignore its
historical analysis as it did in Roe,96 in favor of a "broad enough to
encompass" test, conveniently bypassing the inconvenient
95. The Court's formulation of the right as a right to abortion did logically encompass
the terminating of the unborn child's life, thus taking into account the one other interest at
stake on the facts of Roe. Roe expressly did not consider the rights of fathers of unborn
children or parents of pregnant minors, which were not at issue in Roe. 410 U.S. at 165 n.67.
96. Roe's historical survey demonstrated that the states regulated abortion by statute
in the 19th and 20th centuries. Roe, 410 U.S. at 139.
97. Ignoring the historical evidence of state regulation of abortion, which belies the
claim of an historical liberty, the Court slipped out of the historical trap and employed a
new mode of analysis. Without logical explanation of its action, the Court baldly asserted,
"This right of privacy.., is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not
1990
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(though badly twisted) history of Roe.
The reconsideration of Roe will feature a clash of the histori-
ans, 98 but the burden of proof will be on those urging that abortion
is a fundamental right.9 9 And the history according to Roe, relying
alone on two articles by Cyril Means, has already been discredited
by subsequent scholarship.0 ° Moreover, the Court already knows
the history of abortion regulation, as it did even in 1973. Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist observed, at Webster oral arguments, "[S]urely
abortion was regulated in the 19th century and in the 20th cen-
tury? . ..If you say there is a deeply rooted tradition of freedom
in this area, that suggests that there had been no legislative inter-
vention to me. . . . [tihat simply is not the fact."' 01 Similarly, at
the same oral arguments, Justice Scalia responded to an assertion
of the fundamentality of an abortion liberty, "I know that there
was regulation in the 20th century of abortion. I mean, that is just
common knowledge.
'102
The facts of history have not changed, but substantive due pro-
cess has. The end result will be that there will be found no funda-
mental right to abortion.'0 3
to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 153.
98. Cf. Brief of 281 American Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Web-
ster, 109 S. Ct. 3040, with Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Academy of Medical Ethics
in Support of Appellants [an historical brief]. Minnestoa v. Hodgson, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th
Cir. 1988) (en banc) cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989) (No. 88-1309).
99. ("Since it is Michael's burden to establish [that the right] is so deeply embed-
deded within our tradition as to be a fundamental right, the lack of evidence [of a right]
alone might defeat his case.") Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2343 (plurality opinion).
100. Justice Blackmun, in Roe, relied primarily on an article by Cyril Means for his
history of abortion. See, e.g., 410 U.S. at 135; Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom:
Is a Penumbral of Ninth-Amendment Right About to Arise from the Ashes of a Four-
teenth-Century Common-Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335 (1971). Although the article's schol-
arship was questionable at the time of Roe, for the non-sequiter conclusions it drew, it has
since been effectively refuted, with respect to the validity of both its history and analysis.
See, e.g., Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The Need for a Life Protective Amend-
ment, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 1250, 1267-92 (1975); Dellapenna, The History of Abortion: Tech-
nology, Morality, and Law, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 359, 379-89 (1989); Horan & Balch, Roe v.
Wade: No Justification in History, Law or Logic, Connery, The Ancients and the
Medievals on Abortion: The Consensus the Court Ignored, Deflapenna, Abortion and the
Law: Blackmun's Distortion of the Historical Record, and Arbagi, Roe and the Hippocratic
Oath, in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION (D. Horan, E. Grant & P. Cunningham eds 1987).
101. Transcript of Arguments Before High Court on Abortion Case, N.Y. Times, April
27, 1989, at B12.
102. Id.
103. Pro-abortion advocates may be expected to bring other constitutional challenges
on theories other than substantive due process. None of the alternative theories asserted is
adequate to justify a right to abortion. See generally Bopp, Will There Be a Constitutional
Right to Abortion After the Reconsideration of Roe v. Wade?, 15 J. CONTEMP. L. 131 (1989).
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B. The Right to Carry a Child to Term Passes the New Test for
Fundamentality
Abortion advocates have argued that if a state has the power to
forbid abortion it must logically also have the power to compel
abortion. °4 However, it is apparent that the Court's substantive
due process analysis protects against state-sponsored, forced
abortion.
A proper formulation of the proposed right against forced abor-
tion would be the right of a pregnant woman to carry her unborn
child to term. Testing this proposed right for fundamentality in
the history and tradition of our Nation one finds that not only has
the right of a woman to carry a child to term never been regulated
by the states but that assistance 11 5 and encouragement'06  have
been offered by the states to help women carry their pregnancies to
term. Thus, the protection of a woman's right to carry her unborn
child to term is a fundamental right, protected by the liberty
clause of the fourteenth amendment.10 7 In sum, substantive due
process analysis, once used by an activist Court to advance its own
agenda, is also a valuable tool for protecting activities which his-
104. See, e.g., Respondent's Brief in Opposition [to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari]
at 12-13, Conn v. Conn, 526 N.E.2d 959, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 391 (1988)(No. 88-347)(brief
of the American Civil Liberties Union in a "fathers' rights in abortion" case)("a man who
did not want a child would even have the right to seek a court order forcing a woman to
submit to an unwanted abortion").
105. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health Inc., 462 U.S.
416, 423-24 n.5 (1983) (setting forth the provisions of a city ordinance requiring that a phy-
sician tell the women upon whom he intends to perform an abortion "[t]hat numerous pub-
lic and private agencies and services are available to assist her during pregnancy and after
the birth of her child").
106. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747, 761 (1986)
(discussing a state statute which provided for state-prepared literature to be distributed to
women seeking an abortion describing public and private agencies offering assistance to help
women carry a pregnancy to term and declared that "[tihe [state] strongly urges you to
contact them before making a final decision about abortion"). Even the pro-Roe Court ac-
knowledged that a state has a strong interest in preferring childbirth over abortion which it
may legitimately assert in its funding decisions. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977);
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980)(holding constitutional the decision of Congress to
provide prenatal care for indigent women carrying their unborn children to term but refus-
ing to fund abortions except to save the life of the mother or in cases of rape and incest).
107. In re Mary P., 111 Misc. 2d 532, 444 N.Y.S. 2d 545 (1981). Even the Webster
dissenters would agree that there is a fundamental right to carry a pregnancy to term. Em-
ploying their preferred analysis, they would find that the issue has already been decided,
because Carey v. Population Services International held that the Constitution protects the
fundamental right to decide "whether or not to beget or bear a child," 431 U.S. 678, 685
(1977), which right is "broad enough to encompass," Roe, 410 U.S. at 153, the right to carry
a child to term. Therefore, there can be little doubt that the right to carry a child to term
enjoys unanimous support on the Court, precludes state ordered abortions.
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tory and tradition show to have been valued and protected by the
collective wisdom of successive generations.
V. CONCLUSION
Thus, Webster was a de facto overruling of Roe v. Wade. Web-
ster announced Roe's coming, formal demise. But the Court has
not rejected substantive due process, nor is it likely to do so soon.
Rather, the new Justices, together with the older dissenters to Roe,
seem determined to reform substantive due process, making it an
increasingly objective and neutral tool of constitutional
adjudication.
